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ETHNIC BOUNDARIES AND THE 
MARGINS OF THE MARGIN: 
in a Postcolonial and Conflict Resolution Perspective 
Bent D. Jørgenson 
   
The clouds on the map would move, reform, disappear, break-up into pieces; the pieces would 
reassemble and new distinct areas would form; and the channels between them would expand, contract, 
and shift (Kopytoff, 1985, p.12). 
The theme of this paper is on one of the most elementary questions in the study of ethnicity and 
nationalism, namely how to approach and assess ethnic boundaries'. Should we perceive them as an 
advantageous or a pernicious tool in politics? To answer that question, we need a reference point; 
advantageous or pernicious in relation to whom? I will here use those people(-s) who are so 
marginalized that their voices are practically silenced, and the way in which the political reconstruction, 
conversion, or deconstruction of ethnic boundaries is favorable or not to them; the margins of the 
margin. Do ethnic boundaries, and particularly their political usage, illuminate and create preconditions 
for uplifting, visualization or in any other way favor the margins of the margin? And if yes, how does one 
handle the element of violence which is involved in the politicization and defense of such boundaries? 
On the contrary, if we suggest that ethnic boundaries should be deconstructed, how do we deal with the 
causes of ethnic boundary construction? In order to illuminate these problems, two approaches will be 
critically discussed and applied: Post-Colonialism and Conflict Resolution.  
In recent year these two approaches have gained some influence in International Relations 
theory. Postcolonialism addresses the problem of epistemic violence and marginality. One of the 
fundamental questions is: In what ways have the dominant discourses (particularly emanating in 
the West) marginalized, and still marginalized, subjectivities based on skin-color, gender, 
ethnicity etc. And normatively: How to combat this marginalization? "The empire strikes (or 
writes) back," is a slogan both in the local and global political arena and, I believe, in ever 
growing pockets of the academia. This perspective or school of thought is present almost 
everywhere in the world, but especially in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the 
Caribbean.  
Parallel with the rising voice of marginality, the salience of ethnic and internal conflicts all over 
the world has fueled interest in conflict research in general and the conflict resolution in 
particular. Conflict Resolution has been an attempt to find general methods and schemes of 
solution, develop guidelines for mediation, and/or identify universal processes of conflict 
resolution in particular societies. Bosnia and Israel, among others, have been the targets for the 
attention of such practitioners of conflict resolution.  
Why are these two perspectives brought together into the same discussion? First, because they 
share a normative concern for the same fundamental problem, namely the reconstruction and 
deconstruction of ethnic boundaries. Concerning Postcolonialism, there is a clear emphasis on 
the transformation or conversion of ethnic boundaries from boundaries of marginalization to 
boundaries for 'strategic essentialization' (Krishna, Sankaran, 1993, p.405). Conflict resolution 
approaches ethnic boundaries as crucial 'complications' in processes of conflict resolution and of 
course of prime importance in processes of conflict escalation. Despite the strong normativity in 
both approaches, it is crucial to bear in mind that the margins of the margin play a role in the 
conflict dynamic itself, and therefore, the connection; margins-conflicts-ethnic boundaries have 
to be dealt with, not only normatively but also positively.  
Secondly, the two perspectives are brought into the same discussion as an attempt to open a 
dialogue between two approaches to violence, which have so far largely ignored each other's 
existence(1) In particular, how does one succeed in envisaging and perhaps even uplifting or 'un 
marginalizing' marginal subjects. By 'breaking the ice' between the two approaches to 
international studies, we might end up having two perspectives illuminating each other's blind 
spot, and eradicating some of the worst pre-perceptions and prejudice in both.  
The following are empirical examples from Assam and Southern Bihar in India. My own 
experiences with the people in these two locations have generated the questions and the problems 
formulated in this paper. In both locations, problems associated with the marginalization of the 
margins have led to severe manifest or non-manifest social problems in which ethnic boundaries 
play a key role. In Assam, the tribal groups have slowly emerged as political forces after 
independence, asserting their demands towards regional and central authorities. The modern 
history of Assam illustrates the problem of locating or territorializing the marginalized space 
when elite groups claim the status as 'sons of the soil.' In Southern Bihar, a marginalized region 
in itself, ethnic boundaries cut across relations of dominance, thereby complicating the relation 
between the two phenomena.  
  
Ethnic Boundaries 
Ethnic boundaries, a concept borrowed from Fredrik Barth (Barth, 1982 (1969)), are best 
understood as cognitive or mental boundaries situated in the minds of people and are the result of 
collective efforts of construction and maintenance. Ethnic boundaries dichotomize insiders from 
outsiders--'us' from 'them.' Katherine Verdery's summarizes Barth on this point:  
The roots of [ethnicity as an] organizational form are not in the cultural content associated with ethnic 
identities but rather in the fact of their dichotomization -- the presence of boundaries separating groups. 
This shifts the emphasis from seemingly 'objective' cultural traits to behavior (including 'cultural' 
behavior) that is socially effective in maintaining group boundaries (Verdery, 1994, in Vermeulen & 
Govers, 1994, p. 35). 
There are, in other words, neither objective ethnic boundaries nor objective ethnic groups or 
identities.(2)  
Furthermore, ethnic boundaries are open to multiple individual perceptions and interpretations. 
No wonder that hard social sciences like International Relations, until recently, have turned a 
blind eye to these phenomena. Only the political significance within the last few decades and the 
subsequent demand for explanation and comprehension have pushed these phenomena into the 
limelight of social science.  
Ethnic boundaries are means to create order. They are means of social navigation in a social 
space comparable with the geographical map meant for navigation in our physical environment. 
This knowledge of a social universe is passed on through processes of learning from one 
generation to another or through other channels of communication, simultaneously attaching 
cultural values and features to what appears as an 'inside' and an 'outside.' Seen from the 
perspective of a certain individual, the ethnic boundary is the result of a cognitive reconstruction 
that separates 'us' from 'them.' Ethnic boundaries are thus social constructions and 
reconstructions mostly made peacefully in interaction between individuals.  
This rather 'apolitical' definition of ethnic boundaries is challenged, or rather complemented, by a 
political approach that reveals that ethnic boundaries, and the cultural stuff which they contain, 
are not only negotiable, but also contested. This is close to the postcolonial approach in which 
ethnic boundaries are determined by the dominant discourse. The knowledge about ethnic 
boundaries are carried on via the older generation, the school, the mass media, and the state, or in 
short, those who have the power to define the ethnic boundary towards the marginal, and even to 
define what the marginal is like, i.e. to fill the image of the marginal with cultural content. The 
postcolonial normative approach would, as already mentioned, by a very simplistic description 
advocate the conversion of these marginalizing ethnic boundaries into boundaries of 'strategic 
essentialization' and as a means of resistance against marginalization. On the contrary, in a 
conflict resolution approach, ethnic boundaries would be assessed as obstacles to conflict 
resolutions; as an element of stereotyping the enemy, and putting barriers of effective 
communication, and thereby to get a false comprehension of what is actually and rationally 
going on (e.g-79). Ethnic boundaries are therefore in need of deconstruction. In the following 
discussion, conversion and deconstruction will form the core concepts, or 'lenses' through which 
ethnic boundaries will be illuminated.  
  
Postcolonialism and Conflict Resolution 
Both the postcolonial and the conflict resolution approaches have a strong normative element, as 
they attempt to target the problem of violence-although with emphasis on different aspects of 
violence. In a Postcolonial perspective, the prime evil appears to be the epistemic violence 
committed by the dominant discourse over the marginal. The dominant Western discourse has 
wrested the marginalized of even their ability to conceptualize themselves as people with their 
own history, future, dignity and self-respect. Conflict resolution is, before anything else, a 
method to alleviate further violence, and then open direct violence. This is not to say that 
structural violence is not a matter of concern in conflict resolution. (Johan & Höivik, Tord, 1971, 
p. 73-76) However war, as the ultimate exercise of direct violence, is without doubt also the 
ultimate form of conflict to resolve and avoid.  
More specifically, the two perspectives have rather different approaches to ethno-national 
boundaries. The postcolonial normative approach would, as already mentioned, by a very 
simplistic description advocate the conversion of these marginalizing ethnic boundaries into 
boundaries of 'strategic essentialization' and as a means of resistance against marginalization. In 
a conflict resolution approach, on the contrary, ethnic boundaries would be assessed as obstacles 
to conflict resolutions by stereotyping the enemy and putting up barriers of effective 
communication, thereby creating a false image of what is actually and rationally going on 
(Burton, 1990, p.78-79). Ethnic boundaries are therefore in need of deconstruction. In the 
following discussion, conversion and deconstruction will form the core concepts, or 'lenses' 
through which ethnic boundaries will be illuminated.  
Postcolonialism and conflict resolution could be seen as very different approaches, and they are 
indeed, but it should not be forgotten that both have roots in a critique of the same dominant 
discourses. Conflict resolution emerged as a critique from inside the Western society, 
challenging established institutions of conflict management, e.g. juridical national and 
international practices and theories(3). Postcolonialism became a challenge from outside, as the 
Oriental, the subaltern and the marginal began to speak or write back to the dominant West, 
challenging imperial and colonial discourses.  
On some locations the political practices derived from these two approaches are hidden and acted 
out silently under the surface. However, nowhere is the dynamic between them more apparent 
than in the recent so-called peace process in Israel/Palestine. The conflict resolution practitioners 
have until recently had the advantaged position, bringing the Israeli and Palestinian elite to peace 
talks and institutionalizing cooperation between the two parties. Recently, however, 
postcolonialists have raised their voices and are about to take the lead, pushing the peace-process 
back. The conflicts is not, at least for the moment, between the Palestinians and the Israelis or the 
Muslims and the Jews. It is instead between those in favor of working out ways to make ethnic 
boundaries less politically explosive, and those who want to politicize the boundaries further. In 
the former case, the end of conflict is the prime goal, in the latter the focus is on marginalization.  
Before we enter into a discussion of the two approaches to ethnic boundaries, it should be clear 
that none of them are as coherent and fixed as they will appear below. It is inevitable to 
generalize and leave out certain nuances and aspects which are important for those who have 
brought them forward or those who believe that they are inseparable parts of each tradition. 
However, the aim here is to use these two approaches as rather focused 'spot lights' on the 
problem under scrutiny, not to give a just treatment of two perspectives and their founding 
parents.  
  
Postcolonialism and the Conversion of Ethnic Boundaries 
In the vast literature on Postcolonialism, it is described as a project, a discourse, an ideology, a 
text/narrative, a trend or a variety of these concepts in the same text (Prakash, 1995, 
Introduction). To me, none of these features can be carved out of the composite nature of 
Postcolonialism. That Postcolonialism will appear as an approach in the following text, does not 
mean that the other facets are left out. In fact, the postcolonial approach is the most open-ended 
of the two perspectives probably due to the fact that it spans almost every humanist and social 
science and it has as a consequence a very broad methodological base. Furthermore, and 
probably due to this multifaceted character, Postcolonialism has within it a strong sense of self 
criticism. To fix a certain standpoint in this approach is therefore, to use the conceptual 
framework within the approach itself, to use 'epistemic violence.'  
Post-Colonialism has its origin in Literature and the study of the ex-colonial novel. The task has 
been to expose the subordinate representation of the colonized by the colonizers. The focus on 
text indicates a strong linkage with post-modernism and the difference between the two is not 
always clear. However, Postcolonialism, at least in the form it is presented here, is political and 
normative while post-modernism, at least in its most relativist form, is not.  
[In] the core of the discourse, is a focus on the relations of domination and resistance and the 
effect they have had on identity, in, through, and beyond, the colonial encounter: the prefix 'post' 
is testament to the fact that the problems that lie at the heart of the colonializer-colonized 
relationship are seen to persist beyond colonialism. The importance of reinterpreting the colonial 
experience is relevant to contemporary identity. In the process of resistance, the native voice is 
repositioned and empowered (Darby & Paolini, 1994, p.375).  
The post-colonial approach calls for revival and politicization of the marginalized's 
subjectivities. One of the main questions is "how does one construct provisional and strategically 
essentialized subjectivities to enable a progressive politics" (Krishna, 1993, p.405). The 
marginalized are not only supposed to deconstructed dominant hegemonic discourse, but to 
subvert boundaries from the 'bottom up' and transform the cultural 'stuff' which these boundaries 
enclose. This is problematic in terms of localizing the marginalized space and when we consider 
the problem of marginalization by the marginalized. These are of course central issues for further 
discussion below.  
In India, the postcolonial discourse has had a long history which in fact dates back to figures like 
Tagore, but the most prominent is of course Mahatma Gandhi. He advocated a resistance which 
was asserted as an Indian alternative to Western colonialism. Gandhi in fact illustrates the 
difficulties-and challenges-within Postcolonialism. It is both a category of political movements 
around the world (e.g. Gandhian movements) and an highly sophisticated academic approach 
(e.g. Gandhiism). It is, in other words, both theory and practice, which is a strength, but also 
poses problems of getting ideas, views, and norms across between practitioners and theorists. 
More concretely, the assessment of the central issues here, namely violence, ethnic boundaries, 
and marginality, differs considerably between these two positions. Violent chauvinism, 
marginalizing the margins of the margin might be 'a price worth paying' for the practitioner, 
whereas this is likely to be normatively unacceptable to the theorist far from realpolitik.(4)  
  
Conflict Resolution and the Deconstruction of Ethnic Boundaries 
The other strand of research will be called conflict resolution. It is basically an array of theories 
of conflicts combined with a variety of techniques and methods to solve or manage conflicts.(5) 
However, such characteristics neglect the recent development within the field, where conflict 
resolution has developed into an academic discipline and a rather coherent school of discussion 
and debate. And even though it lacks a coherent theoretical base, it has emerged as a discipline in 
colleges and universities around the world. A great number of scholars are now theorizing about 
conflicts and conflicts resolution creating a body of literature which now forms an embryonic 
approach to conflict and conflict resolution (e.g. Scimecca, J.A., p.19 and 33).  
Conflict resolution is a vast field with a variety of methodological approaches. The common 
normative approach, though, is that conflicts should be solved in an orderly (following certain 
methods) and peaceful way. Peaceful here could mean anything from absence of direct violence 
or threat of violence, to the creation of a certain desirable and non-violent regime. Conflict 
resolution is, first of all, advocating a non-violent ideology. It basically advocates the alleviation 
of violence and then pushes for the development and allocation of conflict solving methods and 
development of institutions geared toward conflict management. For the Postcolonials violence 
is not necessarily a major problem. Frans Fanon, one of the strong influences in the post-colonial 
discourse, has put it this way: "At the level of the individuals, violence is a cleansing force; it 
forces the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him 
fearless and restores his self-respect" (Fanon, 1967, p.94).  
In relation to conflict resolution, this is not just a very different view of violence, but also of its 
psychological function. Within conflict resolution direct physical violence is seen as the highest 
stage of conflict escalation and a result of 'more unconscious and subconscious forces.'(6) It is not 
far to interpret conflicts as a social relation which in fact describes a transformation from 
rationality and reason to irrationality and intuition. And a postcolonial critic would probably add: 
from Western to Non-western.  
If we for a moment separate the field into the two influential fields of Game theory and Human 
needs theory, it is clear that the former has taken the ethnic boundaries as communication 
barriers, which have to be broken down in order to envisage the position of the opponent. Game 
theory is insensitive to cultural differences and the unequal distribution of power. Therefore it 
tells us little about the problems outlined above.(7)  
It is of course disputable whether conflict resolution advocates the deconstruction of ethnic 
boundaries. What about Human needs theory? One of the most influential scholars in this 
conflict resolution approach is undoubtedly John Burton, who belong to the so called London 
School within the field of conflict resolution. In his monumental work, Conflict Resolution and 
Provention, he "seeks to provide a framework for consideration of theory and practice in conflict 
resolution and provention." (Burton, 1990, p.x). He makes a distinction between disputes which 
"are an integral part of a competitive society; and conflicts which are deep-rooted in human 
needs." (Ibid., p.1). The need of identity somehow presupposes the reconstruction of ethnic 
boundaries. According to Burton, we need to have an identity and that implies ethnic boundaries. 
However, the boundary is supposed to be inclusive and not exclusive and discriminatory. Burton 
has also explained his key concept, 'Conflict Provention,' in a way which prevents boundaries 
from becoming politicized barriers. "The term prevention has the connotation of containment. 
The term provention has been introduced to signify taking steps to remove a source of conflict, 
and more positively to promote conditions in which collaborative and valued relationships 
control behavior" (Ibid., p.v ).  
That is to enhance communication between conflicting parties. This is to say that people are not 
supposed to give up their personal and collective identification, but they are not supposed to be 
utilized as a political tool; ethnic boundaries are not to be subverted and strategically 
essentialized. The relation between the concepts of boundaries and needs of identity is objective 
and apolitical (Ibid., p.39f. ).  
If ontological needs exist it follows that the traditional belief that politics is subjective is false. It 
is this discovery, this deduction, that is the core of the contemporary shift in thought. Politics can 
no longer be justified as arbitrary, determined by ideologies and interests. It is possible to assess 
'isms, leadership and systems generally by reference to these needs. We can predict the 
consequences of politics. (Ibid., p.117.)  
Burton's point here is that politics in fact is objective in its cause and development. We can 
assume that conflicts and even their resolution follow the same trajectory. Conflict resolution has 
had a tendency to slip into the grand theorizing about the universal causes and solutions to 
conflicts.(8) The human needs approach accentuates where conflicts derives from the frustration 
of basic human needs. According to Burton, politics is not a subjective realm, but a realm open 
for negotiation between parties with at least theoretical ability to use reason and calculation in 
assessment of human needs. There are two problems with this theory.  
Human needs, like for instance the need for identity, is not an objective force which has a certain 
influence on politics. Human needs are experienced as well as expressed through cultural lenses 
and effected by relations of power. Burton argues that conflicts deriving from the frustration of 
the need of identity, are often to be found in so called multi-ethnic societies (Edward E. Azar's 
makes a similar point. Azar, 1990). For the postcolonials, marginalized human beings act in 
conflicts because they are deprived of their subjective rights which are theirs and realized by 
them. Furthermore, how is the need for identity satisfied and when is it frustrated? Is the need of 
identity frustrated when people almost never express their group belonging, because their social 
environment is indifferent to it, and is it satisfied when people for generations have been 
marginalized by the reconstruction of ethnic boundaries, ascribing an identity onto them? Does 
the frustration of human needs in the margins of the margin lead to conflicts at all, and if so, can 
they be handled the same way as 'other' conflicts? We will have reason to return to these last 
questions. The must fundamental question is of course, could the need of identity be satisfied by 
identifying with humanity?  
  
Ethnic Boundaries and Marginality 
The theoretical connection between ethnic boundaries and marginality can be developed in two 
steps. First, the connection between ethnic boundaries and marginality has to do with the 
exercise of power and culture. Culture indicates not only what is right or wrong but also who has 
the right to decide in these matters. Those who are deprived of the right, at least in relation to the 
dominant, we can call marginal. A great deal of the post-colonial literature deals with the 
colonial power to define a discourse in which the subjugated people were fixed into categories of 
races, castes, religions or tribes, creating a tidy map to conquer and control. Timothy Mitchell 
argues in a citation in Philip Darby and A.J. Paolini's essay:  
modern colonialism was constructed upon a vastly increased power of representation, a power that 
made possible an unprecedented fixing and policing of boundaries; an unprecedented power of 
portraying what lay 'outside.' Power is determined not so much by obvious recourse disparities, but by 
the ability of the colonial order to establish an absolute boundary between the West and the non-West, 
the modern and the past, order and disorder, self and other (Darby & Paolini, 1994, p.375). 
Power is the ability to construct a social boundary in this post-colonial view. Secondly, we can imagine 
that a boundary has a marginal zone, a place which is neither inside, nor outside. It is a socially 
constructed human 'no mans land' in which 'we' have located people (real or imagined) who are neither 
'we' nor 'them', they are rather a subjugated subjectivity, which is a negation of 'we'. Why? Because 
they are needed as a permanent instrument of locating 'we' in relation to 'them', and tell us who 'we' 
are (culture), what are 'our' rights (politics), and what belongs to 'us' (economics) and so forth. Often, 
this space 'in-between' is the margins of the margin. The tribal population in India has in many places 
had that function during centuries. Living either among the dominant caste Hindu's or at the fringes of 
their settlements, they constitute the marginal which is in many places effectively silenced.  
The interesting thing to note is that there is no definite beginnings or ends to the marginal, and 
similarly there is no definite marginalized space which is totally without power. The margin is, 
in other words, a diffuse entity which can contain almost everything which is not commonly held 
as dominant in a specific setting and at a certain point in time. Or again in other words, the 
localization of the margin depends on the location of the observer. Being in the margin there is 
always space which is more marginalized and silenced, and, equally important, more dominant 
space.  
The pitfalls in the conversion and reconstruction of ethnic boundaries are many and sometimes 
even violently disastrous in relation to the margins of the margin. The construction of ethnic 
boundaries could be perceived as an act of violence in the sense that they are forced on 
individuals for whom these divisions are incongruent with their personal perception of social 
boundaries and thereby marginalized these individuals; i.e. they are marginalized by the 
marginalized.  
  
Problems of Conversion and Deconstruction 
The two realms of problems concerning conversion and deconstruction of ethnic boundaries 
which will be sketched out below, basically points to the problems of normativity in the 
postcolonial and conflict resolution approaches. But even more basically, they point to the 
connection between the soft sciences and political action; between theory and practice. Can we 
transform theoretical ideas, results and conclusion into political action and, at the same time, be 
observant from various political standpoints, especially toward those whom are so marginal that 
they are practically silenced?  
  
Where is the Margins of the Margin in Assam? 
How can we possibly locate a marginal space? In the global society, the potentials for group 
formations and hence the conversion of ethnic boundaries are many, and these possibilities are 
often described as ethnic segmentation or stratification (ethnic levels), or in the post-colonial 
debate, as a power hierarchy. With such metaphors in mind, the postcolonial concern is to chose 
the right level in order to make the dominant discourse visible, subvert it, and eventually fight it. 
With this strategy, we might end up repressing the other marginalized groups or the marginalized 
of the marginalized groups. In that case, the strategy is no longer conversion of ethnic 
boundaries, but rather shift of positions from marginal to dominant. However, this distinction is 
not very easy to make for two reasons.  
First, it is not easy to locate a marginalized space. A marginalized space always contains even 
more severely marginalized spaces, which might however seem too 'small' or 'weak' for political 
mobilization. Consequently these subgroups are not only neglected, but also forced into a 
political project which they might not want to be part of, or at least against their interests. 
Localization is, in other words, important. Secondly, this space changes location, disappears, and 
appears depending on a variety of factors. We can not be sure that either the ethnic boundaries or 
the rationale behind their construction and reconstruction will persist, although one important 
part in boundary making is to make them appear as eternal.  
There are several examples to illustrate these problems of location and shift of positions. In the 
state of Assam in Northeast India, the Assamese elite started in the middle of the 19th century, to 
create an Assamese identity in contrast first of all to the dominant Bengali identity. By the 
advent of colonization in the 1820s, the Assamese nobility was removed from the apex of power, 
deprived of their former privileges, and Bengali was declared the official language of the 
province. The Bengali minority moving into the region was apparently successful in constructing 
a boundary towards the Assamese majority. Slowly a mixture of old and new Assamese leaders 
succeeded in subverting this ethnic boundary, and by independence, they gained political control 
of a territory which covered most of present day Northeast India. However, after independence 
five new states have been carved out of the Assam state, and this process doesn't seem to have 
reached a final end.  
Soon after independence, ethnic groups began to emerge as distinct communities with a political 
will different from that of the Assamese majority. The Naga elite demanded independence or 
autonomy immediately after 1947. After a long violent struggle in the mountains of Northeast 
Lastly, the Bodo elite of lowland Assam are demanding an autonomous state carved out of the 
Assam, but within the Indian Union.  
This row of events could be seen as the minorities' slow awakening and proliferation of their 
ethnic boundary toward an ever louder Assamese identity. It is indisputable that the Assamese 
leadership has shifted positions, forcing Assamese language and customs on other groups. This is 
the major impetus for the conversion of the ethnic boundary between the Assamese and the 
tribals. Second, the 'tribal' awakening' has to do with the rise in education and economic power 
of certain segments of the tribal population all over Northeast India, especially after 
independence. Tribal elites have emerged and use their power to assert their subjectivity and 
claim the same rights to control a certain territory as other 'major groups' within the Indian 
Union. In that development, we of course imagine that the marginalized space is moving 
downwards. Today we will find, that certain tribes, and segments of the tribals have no voice at 
all. They have been practically silenced in the struggle for autonomy by relatively dominant 
groups.  
What is interesting here is that during every stage of this process, there are moments of 
conversion of dominating ethnic boundaries (upwards) and simultaneously, silencing of marginal 
subjectivities, i.e. to avoid any 'internal' ethnic boundaries. During the independence struggle, all 
ethnic boundaries were with one exception, successfully repressed. During the so called Assam 
Movement from 1979 to 1983, the differences between groups in Assam were again repressed in 
the struggle of the 'sons of the soil' against the 'foreigners,' mainly Bengali immigrants. In that 
movement, which was extremely violent, most of the casualties were found among the lowland 
tribal population,(9) which today are demanding an autonomous Bodo-land.  
An important aspect to lift to the fore here is that ethnic boundaries almost never fit with the 
'boundaries of marginality.' The class aspect should be brought in here. What is appearing in the 
Assamese context is a new Bengali marginalized group facing the anger of an Assamese majority 
against an historically dominant Bengali upper and middle class. These Bengalis are poor 
peasants fleeing the densely populated Bangladesh and are now trying their luck in Assam as in 
other places in India. How should this marginal Bengali group subvert the ethnic boundary 
which keeps them mired in marginality? Furthermore, the conversion and reconstruction of 
ethnic boundaries depends on the power to convert and reconstruct, and that appears to be in the 
hands of the elites. But sufficient power never enters the margins of the margin, where groups 
are marginalized by the marginalized in the process of subverting the ethnic boundaries of 
domination.  
The fate of the Bengalis in Assam is shared with a great deal of Brahmins in Northern India. 
Now the numerous so-called 'backward castes' are, by democratic means, taking to power, and 
using it violently against their former high caste oppressors. Upper castes like Brahmins are 
however, a socio-economically very diversified group from rich to deeply poor. The latter are the 
victims of the newly born postcolonial politics now as they face the conversion of the caste 
boundary which has kept the lower castes in marginality for centuries.  
Who is marginalizing whom and for what purpose is a question to which I will return soon. At 
this stage, it should be clear that ethnic boundaries are a political means, some would say a 
weapon, whose use of stereotyping and homogenization lead to violent effects, both direct and 
epistemically, on the margins of the margin.  
  
Do the Margins of the Margin have a Voice in Southern Bihar? 
The major handicap for the margins of the margin is not merely economic deprivation, but the 
fact that they have no voice to put forward their demands. 'The subaltern cannot speak.' (Spivak, 
1994, p.104). This fact is a serious challenge to the conflict resolution approach, as it 
presupposes that there are parties involved in a conflict. To practice conflict resolution or 
management presupposes the existence of parties who can negotiate, and enter processes of 
conflict resolution (See e.g. Wallensteen, Peter, 1994, p. 5, 59). I have not heard (!) but I could 
imagine, that there are subjectivities in Bosnia and Israel Palestine which are not present or 
represented at the negotiation tables and are also neglected in the many NGO's which have some 
political influence in this conflict. Similarly in India, there are subjectivities which are generated 
by neither party nor in the political institutions of the conflict.  
In Southern Bihar, we find a population of mixed tribes and caste-Hindus. It is a poor area, with 
all the severity of poverty, and with all social indicators pointing low. People have since the 
colonial era learned to mistrust authorities in many other places including what is commonly 
known as the 'tribal belt' in Central India. Although the phenomenon of the margins of the 
margin is as evident here as in Northeast India, there is a common perception that whatever 
comes 'from above' is of evil. This perception is held by many from school teachers to forest and 
police officials. Furthermore there is little in the present developments which have changed that 
image of power and its institutions.  
When I visited a village in the Ranchi district in Southern Bihar in 1994 and again in 1995, I 
learned that the villagers had had the opportunity to elect one of their own to the village council, 
the Panchayat, which is an elected body presiding over 4-5 villages. This election took place in 
1984 and should have been held again in 1989. But different political interests on the state level 
had postponed the election for years. The official reason was not known to the villagers, but their 
own perceptions were clear, namely that the people with power were not interested in hearing 
their voice. However, their elected Mukia, or headman in the Panchayat, might have been able to 
voice their demands and rights. Unfortunately, he and his family had long ago lost the contact 
with the villagers. He had settled in the town of Ranchi, and was now leading a life totally 
different from that of his former fellows. He had crossed over from, not the ethnic boundary, but 
a backward community to which he belonged into the political establishment. Politicians, despite 
ethnic and ideological differences, have a lot in common in terms of culture and interests.  
Could the margins of the margin raise their voice and appear as a subject or a party in the public 
media, and thereby start that conflict through which they should express their frustrated needs? 
That would require basic reading and writing skills which the villagers in Southern Bihar do not 
possess. The following short story, told to me on a train ride from Calcutta to McCluskieganj in 
Southern Bihar in 1995, illustrates this point. I was told by a school teacher that he had not been 
teaching in his one-man school in a remote tribal area for six month. He had not even been there. 
His own explanation was that it was too far away from his home. The school master was turning 
his blind eye to this apparent case of fraught, as long as he received ten percent of the teacher's 
salary. Now I asked about the fate of the children as they apparently were deprived of their 
education. With a slight surprise in his face, the teacher answered: "The children? They are 
tribals! They cannot learn much anyway."  
There are of course other political forces which offer themselves as representatives to the 
margins of the margin in Southern Bihar. During my visit in 1995, the Naxalite guerrillas had 
settled in the area. They are a Maoist group who are fighting a war against the Indian 
government and larger landholders located primarily in Central and Eastern India. As a guerrilla 
group they are totally dependent on the support of the villagers wherever they settle. When I 
arrived in 1995, the situation was tense and people were scared. The newspaper told about the 
violent conflict between the Naxalites and the government/police. Descriptions of the detailed 
battles between the two parties were followed by the government and police officials view on the 
matter. None of the newspapers contained a single word expressed by the villagers from any part 
of the area. That the villagers were a party, and the losing party, was not mentioned anywhere, 
not even between the lines.  
The fact was that in the village I described above, most of the young men had fled, to avoid 
recruitment by the guerrilla forces or, in the alternative, to be accused by the police for being 
guerrilla soldiers. A nearby village was totally deserted.  
Means of conflict resolution in the present conflict in Southern Bihar would perhaps include the 
government, the locally elected politicians, the guerrillas, the trade Unions and so on, but the 
margins of the margin would certainly be left out. And even if they were invited vors due to a 
deep and perfectly rational mistrust of authority. To put it a bit harshly; there is no conflict at all 
in Southern Bihar, simply because there are no representatives of the marginalized, among whom 
we might expect to find those with frustrated human needs.  
The question arises of course: Could they subvert the boundaries which keep them in their 
marginal position? Unfortunately, their identity as Yadav (a so called backward caste), Munda, 
and Orao, is already subverted by 'their own' elites in their struggle against the high castes. These 
elites are now controlling political bodies. The present Chief Minister of Bihar is a Yadav and 
his political power rests on his caste identity. He and the new 'backward caste elite' have 
succeeded in subverting the ethnic boundary which once held them in backwardness, and now 
use this very boundary both as a means to mobilize sufficient political support and to 
marginalized 'his own caste' (sic.). Again we have a case of shifting positions.  
  
Conclusion 
It is impossible to assess ethnic boundaries per se, in terms of advantages for the margins of the 
margin. The postcolonial attempt to subvert them into political means of resistance does not 
eradicate the phenomenon of marginality. Politicized ethnic boundaries have the tendency of 
dichotomization and hence the use of violence--epistemic or direct--towards whatever is 
different 'inside' or 'outside'. Sankaran Krishna has put it this way:  
I would like to begin by pointing out the irony that it is precisely the greatest victims of the 
West's essentialist conceits (the ex-colonials and neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth) that 
are articulating a need for new strategic essentialisms (Krishna, S., 1993, p.405).  
The line between conversion and shifting positions of domination is not easy to draw in concrete 
situations.(10) There is a risk that the postcolonial strategic essentialism is just a replication of 
dominance on a different level and in a different context, and that marginality is, as already 
indicated, an inescapable part of the construction of ethnic boundaries. Ethnic boundaries may 
be, to put it perhaps too harshly, a mere means of dominance and violence. As Foucault warns:  
one can perfectly well conceive of revolution which leave essentially untouched the power 
relations which form the basis for the functioning of the state As soon as one endeavors to detach 
power with its techniques and procedures from the form of law within which it has been 
theoretically confined up until now, one is driven to ask this basic question: isn't power simply a 
form of warlike domination? (Foucault, 1980, p.123, my emphasis).  
Resistance in the form of strategic essentialization, and hence the conversion of ethnic 
boundaries could be seen as a replication of the techniques and procedures of power. Ethnic 
boundaries are then an inseparable part of the essence of the dominant, which in the 
contemporary inter-state system, rests on the idea of the nation-state as it is outlined in the 
introduction. Power, according to the imperative of the modern inter-state system derives from 
the ability to produce congruity between ethnic/national boundaries and political border. To 
make these two entities, i.e. the territory and the nation, coincide, is not only a violent, but also 
an impossible task which underscores the irony of the modern state.(11) The case of Assam has 
given some indications of this irony, which also question the conversion of ethnic boundaries as 
a long term political strategy. In a longer perspective we might prefer to develop more 
sustainable social forms of interaction. This is actually one of the main concerns in the conflict 
resolution perspective.  
There are also pitfalls in the conflict resolution approach--pitfalls which the Bihari example, in 
part, demonstrated. One such pitfall is the common task of deconstructing the boundaries by 
identifying parties to represent sides of the conflict and bring them into processes of negotiation 
and conflict resolution. In Bihar, the problem would be to identify the parties and especially the 
margins of the margin. Not even the democratic institutions are, in their present form, sufficient 
as means through which conflicts can be handled and solved. Presently, such institutions rest on 
the relations of power, and the ability of one party to silence another.  
To realize that parties in a conflict do not necessarily earn the voluntary support of the group 
they claim to represent is a major challenge to the conflict resolution approach. The Northeastern 
problem of 'state'- building would probably have developed differently if the Indian government 
had been aware of the impossible principle of one tribe-one-state. A more fruitful strategy, might 
have been to transcend the ethnic boundaries and demands put forward by different parties. Such 
an endeavor could have envisaged the margins of the margin before they got suppressed and 
silenced effectively by 'strategic essentialism.' In Bihar, the social tensions are to a large extent 
swept under the carpet for the moment because the margins of the margin are not heard. For 
Conflict resolution practitioners, one of the main challenges ahead is to comprehend the meaning 
and effect of marginality in conflicts as well as in processes of conflict resolution.  
However, at least some of the intentions in the conflict resolution approach should be considered 
in relation to the margins of the margin. First of all, the primary goal is to avoid direct violence. 
This does not prevent political struggles, but it marks a clear standpoint -- that human life should 
not be sacrificed for the sake of a better society for the living. Secondly, the conflict resolution 
approach implies the will to find channels of communication; building bridges. This is important 
especially if methods are developed to raise the voice of the margins of the margin. The 
challenge is probably not to give a voice to a silenced party, but to create conditions and 
institutions through which the margins of the margin can speak. The obstacle so far has been 
universalism and insensitivity to culture, particularity, and power. Power has not only a direct 
impact on conflicts between the state and minorities, but on the very ability to speak and thereby 
to become visible in conflict resolution processes and political institutions. The two perspectives 
under scrutiny here, have in other words, a lot to contribute with to a more coherent perspective 
on political ethnic boundaries, violence, and marginality.  
  
Notes 
1. For an an exception see Avruch, et al (eds.),1991.  
2. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen has pointed out, the most serious, and perhaps common, pitfall in 
the study of ethnicity and nationalism is that of reification. (Eriksen, 1993). The fluidity of ethnic 
boundaries is described by Igor Kopytoff in the initial quote above.  
3. As Joseph A Scimecca writes: " conflict resolution was born in a time of questioning whether 
traditional legal authority served the needs of people or supported a status quo that reinforced 
social and political inequality. [It was] a challenge to traditional authority, questioning of top-
down, centralized decision making. the "power paradigm" was challenged via the notion that 
human beings seek to fulfil their basic human needs rather than always seeking power and 
material interests", (Scimecca, 1991, p.20).  
4. Gandhi's and the Congress' handling of the so-called indigo-riots in 1917 and other similar 
social conflicts in Bihar clearly indicates that the lower castes were submerged under the 
principal conflict between the Congress and the British Empire. This is not to say that lower 
castes were not a crucial political weapon, but this weapon was firmly laid in the hands of the 
dominant castes. See (Frankel, 1989).  
5. The conflict resolution literature range from texts on the human nature and the undiscovered 
conflict resolution potentials in human beings to concrete guidelines for intervention. (See e.g. 
Parry, 1991). At the other end of the spectra (Azar, 1990). There are also examples of invention 
of a new rational 'grammar' with the aim to render communication transparent in conflict 
situations and in everyday life (see e.g. Rosenberg, 1983).  
6. Glasl has, among other, developed a stage model of conflict escalation and resolution (Glasl, 
1982).  
7. Ashis Nandy rightly observes "that the oppressed, when faced with problems of survival, had 
no obligation to follow any model or rules of the game." (Nandy, 1987, p.121).  
8. For a broader discussion of the rationale perspective in conflict resolution see also 
Wallensteen, 1994, p.14. Also Azar, 1990, p. 42-48.  
9. 5-7000 people were killed in two weeks time. (Gupta, 1984, p.2).  
10. Even though G. Spivak has emphasized the heterogeneity and syncretic nature of the 
colonized and the colonizers, she does not disclaim the basic standpoint, that colonizer-colonized 
is the basic cleavage (wherever it emerges) and that this dynamic has to be found and the 
politicization encouraged. In that sense Spivak only points to a problem in the process of 
essentializing, but does not disclaim it. (Spivak, G., 1994).  
11. The best discussion which I have come across so far is an article by Sankaran Krishna, 
(Krishna, 1994, pp.507-521).  
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